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If ever there was a case in controversy ripe for resolution by the Supreme Court of the
State of Idaho, this case is it. Generally speaking, the facts have been developed to the point that
there is little factual dispute. A general look at the case law cited by each side reveals that each
party interprets the exact same cases as supportive of their position. However, the NIBCA have
the benefit of precedent on their side and the City's interpretation of the case law fails when
applied against the facts at hand. Specifically, there is no grant of authority that allows local
jurisdictions to collect a fee that will be used solely to raise revenues to fund future expansion.
Municipal power is a classic example of derivative power. It is a
longstanding rule in Idaho that cities possess only the powers
expressly conferred on them by the legislature or which can be
derived by necessary implication. This Court has articulated this
rule as a strict limitation when construing municipal powers:
"municipalities may exercise only those powers granted to them or
necessarily implied from the powers granted ... [and i]f there is a
fair, reasonable, substantial doubt as to the existence of a
power, the doubt must be resolved against the city." This rule is
especially applicable to proprietary functions, of which garbage
collection services are included. Plummer v. City of Fruitland, 140
Idaho 1, 5 (2003) on reh'g, 139 Idaho 810 (2004) (Internal
Citations Omitted, Emphasis Added).
PART I.

REPLY BRIEF

With exception to an entirely new argument, the City in its brief cite to the very statutes
that NIBCA, the Appellant, established as invalid in their opening brief; specifically 63-1311 and
50-1023 et. seq.
The City concedes in its brief that it must prove the existence of some granting authority
in order for its fee to stand. "The powers of local governments are limited to those granted or
clearly implied by the state constitution or legislation.... Hence the only fees that are lawful
without statutory authorization are 'incidental regulatory fees.' Every other fee must have some
specific statutory basis." (Respondent Brief pp 14-15, parenthetical omitted).
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1. User Fee Rebuttal

The City's reliance on Idaho Code§ 63-1311 (the user fee statute) fails, as the fee is
indisputably being used to fund future capital improvement projects. This Court has repeatedly
found that a user fee can only be imposed to provide for a service being rendered. The City
a

lS

(Respondent Brief p. l

as

revealed in NIBCA's opening brief, the City already has a separate and distinct user fee for
sewer services; the City calls it a bi-monthly fee. The fee at issue before this Court is in no way
reasonably related to a service being provided. It is to establish a slush fund to build future
capital improvement projects.
In its user fee argument, the City cites the Brewster v. City of Pocatello 115 Idaho 502
( 1988) and Property Owners Association v. Kootenai County 115 Idaho 67 6 (1989) cases as
support for their disguised tax. The City's fee fails the Brewster test as the fee is based upon the
Welch Comer Report which is unrelated to the cost of the services being rendered or even to
capacity replacement. By the Report's own admission, it was merely looking for a method to
fund the City's "ambitious $20 million capital improvement plan." (R. Aug. p.0041113.5.2).
The City's citation to the Kootenai County case is completely inapplicable to the case at
hand, as the statute at issue in the Kootenai County case clearly authorized the use of fees to
acquire future landfill sites. Despite this vast and critical difference between the Kootenai

County statute and Idaho Code § 63-1311, the City startlingly states that the Kootenai County
case "is on all fours with the instant litigation and it destroys the builder's argument ... "
(Respondent Brief p. 22). This is smoke and mirrors logic.
2. Equity Buy-In Fee Rebuttal

The second source of authority the City cites is Idaho Code § 50-1027 et. seq., the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act. The Act allows local jurisdictions to "prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls
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or charges ... " for public works. (Idaho Code § 50-1030). This is known as the equity buy-in
theory, and is based on the value of a current existing system.
Again, this Court has a history of case law pertaining to equity buy-in fees, the most
noteworthy case being Loomis v. City of Hailey 119 Idaho 434 (1991). The Loomis analysis in
NIBCA' s opening

sufficiently explains why Luomis does not stand for the concept of

enacting an equity buy-in fee solely to be used for future expansion. In summary, the City's
formula has no correlation to the existing system a customer is connecting to. It is pertinent to
know that the Loomis case was reviewing the second variation of the City of Hailey's equity
buy-in fee, as the first variation was struck down by a lower court because it was doing exactly
what the City of Hayden is attempting to do:
In 1983 a suit against the City entitled Redman, et. al. v. Hailey,
Blaine County Case No. 11855 ... The District Court in that case
held that the connection fees were in violation of the Idaho
Constitution and void because the City was collecting fees for
future expansion and enlargement of the system. Loomis at 435.
The Loomis court was reviewing the City of Hailey's revised fee after the City of Hailey realized
it could not include taxation for expansion in its equity buy-in fee. However, the Loomis court
specifically stated that it was not providing an opinion on the concept of using equity buy-in fees
for future expansion:
Although the City of Hailey argues that a municipality may charge
a fee for future expansion, that issue is not present in the instant
appeal. . . . Since the precise issue of whether fees may be
collected for future expansion of a sewer or water system is not
before us on this appeal, we leave for another day a determination
of that issue. Loomis at 439 f. 3.
One might say we have arrived at "another day."
The City next relies on the case Viking Construction v. Hayden Lake Irrigation District
149 Idaho 187 (2010) as justification that an equity buy-in fee can be used solely to fund future
NIBCA REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL RESPONSE BRIEF - PAGE 3

expans10n. In advancing this argument, the City ignored the fundamental basis of the decision in
Viking. Viking held that a fee to buy into a current system would not be invalid just because it

resulted in incidental reserves for replacing or improving the system. In order to accept the
City's argument you must first believe that the $20 million being collected by the City is an
incidental reserve. However, most importantly the Viking case mandated a calculation of the
value of the current system stating:
However, for the connection fee to be an equity buy-in, it must be
based upon some calculation designed to determine the value of
that portion of the system that the new user will be utilizing. If
there is no attempt to calculate in some manner that value, then the
connection fee is not an equity buy-in, regardless of its label.
Viking at 194.
The City's fee is not an equity buy-in fee as it raises $20 million in revenue for the City and is
not tied to the value of the current system.

3. Home Rule Issue
The final statutes cited by the City, 50-320 and 50-323, are entirely new concepts never
argued below. The City acknowledges that 50-320 is raised for the first time upon appeal, but a
cursory review of the table of contents on the City's briefs below reveals that the City is
surprisingly raising not one new argument but two, as 50-323 was never argued before either.
The City cannot make these arguments at this time as it is a long standing rule of this Court that
matters raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. "It is axiomatic that an issue
not raised below will not be considered for the first time by this Court." Butters v. Hauser, 125
Idaho 79, 82 (1993).
This long standing rule is so axiomatic, new arguments are typically dispatched with one
or two sentences and has been employed by this Court as recently as March 2014. "We do not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal." Morgan v. New Sweden Irr. Dist., 156 Idaho
NIBCA REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL RESPONSE BRIEF - PAGE 4

247, _

(2014), reh'g denied (May 2, 2014). The court has enacted this rule for several reasons

not the least of which is that parties on appeal who find their trial court foundation falling apart
as is happening to the City here, commonly make desperate grasps at new and controversial
positions.
Before addressing the significance of the City's request, it is important to emphasize that
not only is this argument raised for the very first time on appeal, it is in direct contradiction to
the City's position and argument below. Its brief stated:
The law on this subject is simple. Idaho cities are not home rule
cities with respect to raising revenue, so they must have
authorization for any tax. (City's Opening Brief p. 8, emphasis
added).
Idaho follows Dillon's Rule under which the powers of local
governments are limited to those granted or clearly implied by the
state Constitution or legislation. This is in contrast to other states
that have granted home rule status to municipal governments. As
our Supreme Court has said, "Thus, under Dillon's Rule, a
municipal corporation may exercise only those powers granted to it
by either the state constitution or the legislature and the legislature
has absolute power to change, modify or destroy those powers at
its discretion. Ceaser v. State IOI Idaho 158, 160, 610 P.2d 517,
519 (1980). (City's Opening Brief p. 11, emphasis added).
It is not simply that the City is raising a new argument; it does so in the face of the black and
white statement above and is directly contradicting what it stated to the lower court.
Nevertheless, if one were to look past this well established rule of law which precludes
the City from making these arguments, one would discover the arguments raised by the City are
shocking in the least. The City is actually advocating for this Court to overturn a hundred years
of precedent, dating back to Idaho's inception and grant "home rule" authority to Idaho cities.
Simply put, the City of Hayden is asking for this Court to grant every city in Idaho the
unfettered and uncontrolled ability to enact any tax or fee they so desire.

In a gross

understatement, the City calls this "cutting edge stuff." (Respondent Brief p. 36). Catastrophic
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upheaval would be a more appropriate description. This outlandish argument that Idaho is a
home rule state directly controverts literally all Idaho case law on the matter issued by this Court.
Our analysis of this issue necessarily involves a review of the basic
tenets of municipal corporation law. Idaho has long recognized the
proposition that a municipal corporation, as a creature of the state,
possesses and exercises only those powers either expressly or
& Light Co. v.
impliedly granted to
Sandpoint, 31 Idaho 498,503, 173 P. 972,973 (1918); Boise Dev.
Co. v. Boise City, 30 Idaho 675,688, 167 P. 1032, 1034-35 (1917).
This position, also known as "Dillon's Rule," has been generally
recognized as the prevailing view in Idaho. Moore, "Powers and
Authorities of Idaho Cities: Home Rule or Legislative Control?"
14 Idaho L.Rev. 143, 147, n. 18 (1977) (for cases supporting this
view). Thus, under Dillon's Rule, a municipal corporation may
exercise only those powers granted to it by either the state
constitution or the legislature and the legislature has absolute
power to change, modify or destroy those powers at its discretion.
Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160 (1980).
Idaho has long recognized the proposition that a municipal
corporation, as a creature of the state, possesses and exercises only
those powers either expressly or impliedly granted to it. Caesar,
610 P.2d at 519. Accordingly, we must review Idaho law 1 to
determine whether the City has that power. Alliance for Prop.
Rights & Fiscal Responsibility v. City of Idaho Falls, 742 F.3d
1100, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2013)
Municipal corporations in Idaho may exercise only those powers
granted to them by the state Constitution or the legislature. Caesar
v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160, 610 P.2d 517, 519 (1980);
Washington Water Power Co. v. Kootenai, 99 Idaho 875, 591 P.2d
122 (1979); Arrow Transp. Co. v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 85
Idaho 307, 379 P.2d 422 (1963); Sandpoint Water & Light Co. v.
City ofSandpoint, 31 Idaho 498, 173 P. 972 (1918).
Alpertv. Boise Water Corp., 118Idaho 136, 142(1990).
This Court should refuse to consider the City's new arguments raised for the first time on appeal,
as they are directly contrary to its assertions to the lower court. This Court should maintain the
century of precedence limiting Idaho local governments' powers to only those expressly granted
to them through constitutional or legislative authority.

NIBCA REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL RESPONSE BRIEF
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This argument is a crystal clear example of where the cities would go if left unchecked.
It highlights the needs for legislative and judicial oversight of all local jurisdictions.
PART II. RESPONSE TO APPEAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES DECISION
1. Summary

litigation lasted less

a year. Over the course of that year, both parties worked

diligently to research and argue their respective positions. However, this case had only three
substantive court hearings: a motion to vacate the hearing date, a motion to compel/protective
order and a motion for summary judgment. It is important to note that the motion for summary
judgment found certain conclusions of law in favor of the City, however it also found certain
issues of fact critical to how the City was spending the fee revenue.
The City then asserted that it was entitled to an excessively inflated award of $221,543.00
for attorney fees claiming that the case was brought "without a reasonable basis in fact or law."
The trial court soundly rejected the City's request only awarding costs. The City claims to be the
prevailing party in the suit based solely on the final judgment. However, the process which
resolved this litigation is based on a negotiated settlement in which the City was forced to admit
$555,986.73 in improper expenditures from the capitalization fee account and $760,575.90
improperly spent from the operations and maintenance account. (First Affidavit of Donna
Phillips, R. Vol. III pp. 657-668)

2. Standard of Review
The City's request for attorney fees is based on Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) and (2), which
state:
(l) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding
involving as adverse parties a state agency or a political
subdivision and a person, the state agency, political subdivision or
the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award
NIBCA REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL RESPONSE BRIEF - PAGE 7

the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and
other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
(2) If a party to a proceeding prevails on a portion of the case, and
the state agency or political subdivision or the court hearing the
proceeding, including on appeal, finds that the nonprevailing party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that
portion of the case, it shall award the partially prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable
expenses with respect to that portion of the case on which it
prevailed. (Emphasis Added).
This Court has regularly held that the "without a reasonable basis in fact or law" standard
is synonymous with the frivolous standard of LC.§ 12-121. ''The requirement ofl.C. § 12-117
that the party acted without a reasonable basis is similar to the requirement of LC.§ 12-121 that
the cause was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."

Total Success Investments v. Ada County Highway District, 148 Idaho 688, 695 (2010). "Both
LC.§ 12-117 and§ 12-121 permit the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party if the court
determines the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation." Nation v. State Dept. of Corrections, 144 Idaho 177, 194 (2007).
The award of attorney's fees lies within the sound discretion of the Trial Court, the Idaho
Court of Appeals has instructed that, "[s]uch award is appropriate when [the] Court is left with
the abiding belief that the [case] has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation." Suitts v. First Security Bank of Idaho, 125 Idaho 27 (Ct. App. 1993)
(Emphasis added).
In reviewing a trial court's denial of attorney's fees, Idaho appellate courts use the abuse
of discretion as standard. "An award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P.
54(e)(l) will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." (Idaho Military Historical Soc'y,

Inc. v. Maslen, 39909, 2014 WL 2735320 (Idaho June 17, 2014, Internal Citations Omitted).
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When an exercise of discretion is involved, this Court conducts a three-step inquiry: ( 1) whether
the trial court properly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether that court acted
within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. Id

The lower court issued a lengthy memorandum as to exactly why it was not left with the
belief that this case was frivolous.

3. The Lawsuit was Brought with a Reasonable Basis in both Fact and Law
A. The factual and legal issues of this case are ones of first impression in Idaho.
"When dealing with an issue of first impression, [courts] are generally reluctant to find an
action unreasonable." Ciszek v. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, 151 Idaho 123, 135
(2011 ). In Ciszek, property owners brought an action against the county to declare a zoning
change invalid because the county commissioners had approved zoning changes on two separate
parcels, but the landowner had only filed one application. Even though the county eventually
prevailed, this Court ruled that the county was not entitled to an award of attorney fees, stating
"[b]ecause this Court has never addressed whether a local governing body is within its authority
to approve two rezones based on a single application, we decline to award attorney fees to
Respondents." Id. at 135.
The case at hand follows similar circumstances as those found in Ciszek. The City would
have this Court believe that the case law is well settled on whether a municipality may charge
capitalization fees exclusively for the use of future expansion of its sewer system. However,
there is not one statute or Idaho appellate court decision that has dealt exclusively with whether
municipalities may charge capitalization fees solely to fund future expansion projects. No other
jurisdiction has ever had this type of peculiar fee structure reviewed by any court; most other
NIBCA REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL RESPONSE BRIEF
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municipalities use Impact Fees to accomplish what the City is trying to do.
The closest the City can get to "well settled" case law is citing one sentence in one case.
The City rests its whole argument on Viking Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irrigation Dist., 149
Idaho 187 (2010) which states, "The intent is to prevent such districts from transferring to their
general funds revenues

works financed

bonds

full and adequate

has

been made for the five listed purposes, including providing the reserve for improvements to
those works." Id at 197. Nothing in this sentence states an authorization that municipalities
may, in lieu of following bonding procedures, charge capitalization fees to be used for the future
expansion of the municipality's sewer system.
A reasonable legal argument was made by NIBCA and the lower court found:
As to the factual issues brought before the Court, by the City's
own admission, there were accounting errors. The Court
acknowledges that those errors were fixed and, ultimately,
Plaintiffs withdrew their claims relating to those accounting errors.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that there were substantial issues of
materials fact regarding the expenditures by the City, and thus it
cannot be said that Plaintiffs acted without a reasonable basis in
fact. Therefore, the Court finds that because Plaintiffs acted with a
reasonable basis in both fact and law, an award of attorney's fees
pursuant to LC. § 12-117 is not appropriate in the case at bar.
(Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Attorney Fees p. 13, R.
Vol. III, p. 818).
The trial court who personally witnessed each party's argument and conduct ruled NIBCA's suit
was not brought frivolously or in bad faith.
B. Even with the existing Idaho law, a reasonable dispute existed over the legal basis

for the City's fee.
Where there is a "reasonable controversy over the application of [a statute or law] to the
circumstances[,]" an award of attorney fees under LC. § 12-117 is inappropriate. Central Paving
Co., Inc. v. Idaho Tax: Commission, 126 Idaho 174, 178 (1994). "[F]rivolous conduct ... means
conduct or argument of counsel that is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and
NIBCA REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL RESPONSE BRIEF - PAGE 10

cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law." Hanf v. Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 370 (1991). In Hanf, although
considering an award of attorney fees under LC. § 12-121, the trial court found Idaho law to be
unclear regarding a broker's duty in a real estate transaction. "The trial court, having found
Idaho lav. to be unclear, uncertain and conflicting, examined conflicting authority from other
jurisdictions to determine the broker's duty." Id. The Court found that because the existing
Idaho case law was unsettled, plaintiffs legal argument could not be found to be "so plainly
fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, or that their case was not supported by a good faith
argument" so to justify an award of attorney fees. Id.
"A misperception of law or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable
conduct. Rather, the question must be whether the position adopted by the [plaintiff] was not
only incorrect but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or
without foundation." Lowery v. Board of County Commissioners for Ada County, 115 Idaho 64,
69 (1988), quoting Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 911 (Ct. App. 1984).
"Where questions of law are raised, attorney fees should be awarded under LC. § 12-121 [or§
12-117] only if the nonprevailing party advocates a plainly fallacious, and therefore, not fairly
debatable, position." Id.
This case is directly on point with the holding in Hanf, in which the trial court had to look
to foreign jurisdictions to assist in determining the outcome of the case. Here, the lower court
cited authority from Arizona and Florida to clarify uncertainties in Idaho law. Although NIBCA
was ultimately unsuccessful in asserting its legal position, the mere fact that it argued that this
was an unsettled area of law does not indicate that its position was plainly fallacious and not
fairly debatable. The mere fact that the City allegedly expended considerable legal resources,
$221,543.00, shows that legitimate legal arguments were being made by NIBCA. NIBCA's
NIBCA REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL RESPONSE BRIEF - PAGE 11

conduct in bringing this cause of action cannot be found to be so simple and without foundation
as to justify penalizing NIBCA with a quarter million dollar award of attorney fees to the City.
C. NIBCA raised legitimate factual concerns regarding the City's expenditures of
funds from the capitalization fee account.
Courts are loathe to punish parties for exercising their legal rights and therefore have set
a very high bar for finding frivolous conduct. "If there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact or a
legitimate issue of law, attorney fees may not be issued under [I.C. § 12-121 or § 12-117] even
though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable or
without foundation." Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 639 (2006). "[T]he total [prosecution]
of a party's proceedings must be unreasonable or frivolous before an award of attorney fees was
justified under LC. § 12-121 [and§ 12-117] and Rule 54(e)." Turner v. Willis, 119 Idaho 1023,
1025 (1991), quoting Magic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Business Services,

Inc., l I 9 Idaho 558, 563 (1990). "[I]t is not appropriate to segregate those claims and defenses
to determine which were or were not frivolously defended or pursued." Id.
Arguing for a moment that this Court was inclined to find that NIBCA had in fact
pursued portions of this suit frivolously, and that the lower court abused its discretion, this Court
would still be hard pressed to find a legal basis to award attorney fees to the City. In the lower
court's 1tfemorandum Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's

A1otion for Summary Judgment it was ruled that there were legitimate issues of material facts
concerning the City's expenditures of funds from its capitalization fee account. (R. Vol. Ill pp.
657-668). This was a result of NIBCA presenting evidence to the lower court of a sampling of
these misappropriations which eventually the City had to concede. See First Affidavit of Donna

Phillips, (R. Vol. III pp. 657-668) where the city identified a total of $555,986.73 in improper
expenditures from the capitalization fee account and an additional $760,575.90 of fees from their
NIBCA REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL RESPONSE BRIEF
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operations and maintenance account. Although a settlement was ultimately negotiated
concerning these misappropriated funds, it cannot possibly be said that NIBCA did not raise a
legitimate triable issue and in fact prevailed on getting each account refunded. Therefore, an
award for attorney fees under I. C. § 12-117 would have been inappropriate.
The City

"The district court's determination of prevailing party status for the purpose of awarding
attorney fees and costs is within the court's sound discretion." Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ
Construction, LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 47 (2012). "This Court has held that the trial court has the

discretion to decline an award of attorney fees when it determines that both parties have
prevailed in part." Id
As stated above, NIBCA and the City, working together, identified $555,986.73 in
improper expenditures from the capitalization fee account and $760,575.90 from the operations
and maintenance account.

(Phillips Ajf, Page 10. R. Vol. III p. 666).

Although NIBCA

discovered several discrepancies in the accounting presented in the Phillips Affidavit, NIBCA
was generally satisfied with the City's admission to error and the proposed corrections. NIBCA
chose not to quibble over small errors in the Affidavit and entered into the Stipulation that ended
this case. (Jameson Ajf, ,r 4. R. Vol. IV, p. 843).
The accounting discrepancies were not as inconsequential or "minor accounting errors"
as the City would have this Court believe. (Respondent Brief, page 38).

The City is not the

prevailing party as required by LC. 12-117.

5. The City's Attorney Fees Are Unreasonable Given the Time and Labor
Required to Resolve this Case Prior to Trial
This case was initiated by NIBCA on April 12, 2012. Less than a year later on April 5,
2013, the lower court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying
NIBCA REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL RESPONSE BRIEF

PAGE 13

in Part The City's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. Vol. III, p. 634). Thereafter, both parties
worked together to formulate a mutual compromise to resolve any outstanding factual issues
prior to trial.
Exactly 358 days passed between filing suit and the lower court's Memorandum Decision

and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part The City's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The City is claiming it is entitled to an award of $221,543.00. This amount equates to roughly
$620.00 per day, including Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, billed to the City during the
pendency of this suit. Given counsels' average billing rate, this means that the City's attorneys
spent nearly 2.2 hours a day, every day, over the last year. Fourth Affidavit of Christopher H

Meyer, 1 13 (filed July 16, 2013 R. Vol. III p. 682). It is not only unreasonable but unfathomable
that any attorney would need to dedicate that amount of time, including weekends and holidays,
for an entire year on three hearings.
In contrast, NIBCA spent only $51,896.83 to advance this case through summary
judgment and final settlement. Jameson Aff. 1 6 R. Vol. IV p. 843). Granted litigation strategy
varies from case to case and from Plaintiff to Defendant, but it is incomprehensible to believe
that the City spent over four times the amount of time, effort and legal resources necessary to
defend this litigation.
The City's attorney fees are clearly unreasonable given the scope of this litigation which
was resolved through summary judgment and negotiated settlement.
6. Attorneys Fees on Appeal

The City has made application for appellant attorney's fees under the same frivolous
arguments it used in the lower court. The City's request should be denied for the same reasons
stated in the lower court's decision and as argued above.
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CONCLUSION
As stated herein and in its appellant brief, NIBCA respectfully requests this court find the
City's fee which collecting revenue solely for future expansion be voided as there is no basis in
Idaho law for such a fee.
NIBCA respectfully requests that this Court reject the City's assertions that the lower
court abused its discretion and that NIBCA need to be punished for exercising their rights in
challenging the legal foundation of a municipality's fees. Punishment would only serve to have
a chilling effect for all citizens throughout this state. Further, accepting and awarding an
attorney's fees of this size after only three hearings will only serve to encourage law firms to run
up excessive bills in the future. Each party should bear their own costs and fees.

Respectfully submitted this 23 rd day of June, 2014.

RISCH • PISCA, PLLC
Attorneys for Appellant, North Idaho Building
Contractors Association

JASON S. RISCH
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 23 rd day of June, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL RESPONSE BRIEF as follows:
Christopher H. Meyer
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLC
601 W. Bannock St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorneys for City of Hayden

[ ]
[X]
[ ]
[ ]

Certified U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 350-7311
Overnight Mail
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